The Evolutionary Brain Glitch That Makes Terrorism Fail

Bruce Schneier has an interesting article at Wired that looks at a cognitive bias known as correspondent inference theory and how it relates to terrorism. Correspondent inference theory is basically the idea that humans will always tend to make inferences about a person’s behaviour based on the consequences of that behaviour. So, in regards to terrorism, Schneier argues that we see the effects of terrorism, such as limitations on civil liberties, economic consequences, and so on, and assume that this is the intent of terrorism.

Schneier links to research by Max Abrams [pdf] that studied a broad range of terrorist groups, identifying 42 policy objectives, but finding that these were only ever achieved 7 percent of the time. In other words, he found that terrorism doesn’t work in terms of achieving the objectives of terrorists.

Applying correspondent inference theory to this observation, Abrams writes:

The theory posited here is that terrorist groups that target civilians are unable to coerce policy change because terrorism has an extremely high correspondence. Countries believe that their civilian populations are attacked not because the terrorist group is protesting unfavorable external conditions such as territorial occupation or poverty. Rather, target countries infer the short-term consequences of terrorism — the deaths of innocent civilians, mass fear, loss of confidence in the government to offer protection, economic contraction, and the inevitable erosion of civil liberties — (are) the objects of the terrorist groups. In short, target countries view the negative consequences of terrorist attacks on their societies and political systems as evidence that the terrorists want them destroyed. Target countries are understandably skeptical that making concessions will placate terrorist groups believed to be motivated by these maximalist objectives.

Or, as Schneier explains:

In other words, terrorism doesn’t work, because it makes people less likely to acquiesce to the terrorists’ demands, no matter how limited they might be. The reaction to terrorism has an effect completely opposite to what the terrorists want; people simply don’t believe those limited demands are the actual demands.

This theory explains, with a clarity I have never seen before, why so many people make the bizarre claim that al Qaeda terrorism — or Islamic terrorism in general — is “different”: that while other terrorist groups might have policy objectives, al Qaeda’s primary motivation is to kill us all.